Over the past days, we have observed the sad explosion at Apeatse in the Bogoso District and the devastating toll on the people of Apeatse, with 14 dead, 155 injured, 945 displaced and an entire rural community destroyed as per the latest statistics from NADMO. These innocent people have no business with the activities of the minerals explosives company but have had to deal with the consequence of a devastating major accident hazard.
The principle of duty of care as enshrined in the moral argument for managing health and safety makes it absolutely and unequivocally clear that causing pain and suffering to workers and persons who may be affected by an organization’s undertaking is totally unethical and unacceptable, especially when pain and suffering arise from preventable accidents which are due to negligence.
The magnitude of the impact of this explosion highlights the weakness of the institutions charged to uphold and promote a high standard of safety and environmental protection. It highlights how the regulations have once again failed to protect the citizenry, how the enforcement authority has failed to control duty holders, and how duty holders have had a field day of negligence. At this point, no amount of excuses can justify any deviations. When an incident of this magnitude occurs, it definitely raises questions about the integrity of our institutions, the role of the Minerals Commission, the role of the EPA, the role of the Ministries, and the role of the Persons in Charge.
In this video podcast, I do a news review of the rapid actions that have transpired and made headlines since the incident happened to give my opinion from the safety lens, I also try to answer the BIG question; Is the incident a case of an institutional failure? and finally I ask about the role of the enforcement authority, the duty holders and the employees in the mix of the incident.
To answer the above, I dived into the Mining and Minerals Explosives Regulation 2012 (L.I 2177) to critique the requirements for the transport of explosives, and general remit of the law which makes no mention of the principle of AlARP as it is prescriptive and does not categorize explosives security risk levels as juxtaposed with an Australian Code for Transport of Explosives by Road and Rail. I also questioned the role of the enforcement authority regarding the measures taken to control work through a permit to transport explosives and requirements for adequate notification 48 hours ahead as prescribed under sections 1 and 2 of regulation 33 to ensure adequate scrutiny. I again looked at the possible failures from the duty holder regarding risk assessment, reducing risk based on the principle of ALARP, adequate emergency response planning, and control of work. I then proposed the way forward by calling for a new WAY of thinking in the light of the barrier management philosophy as practiced in the oil and gas industry, the importance of learning from incidents, and the need to pass the OSH Bill and reform the OSH legal structure by adopting the single basic legal framework. Enjoy the video and please share your comments.
By Selorm Ametewee IDipNEBOSH.